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Abstract. A mobile ad hoc network (MANET) is formed by a group of mobile wireless nodes, each of which
functions as a router and agrees to forward packets for others. Many routing protocols (e.g., AODV, DSDV, DSR,
etc) have been proposed for MANETs. However, most assume that nodes are trustworthy and cooperative. Thus,
they are vulnerable to a variety of attacks. We propose a secure routing protocol based on DSDV, namely S-DSDV,
in which, a well-behaved node can successfully detect a malicious routing update with any sequence number fraud
(larger or smaller) and any distance fraud (shorter, same, or longer) provided no two nodes are in collusion. We
compare security properties and efﬁciency of S-DSDV with superSEAD. Our efﬁciency analysis shows that S-DSDV
generates high network overhead, however, which can be reduced by conﬁgurable parameters. We believe that the
S-DSDV overhead is justiﬁed by the enhanced security.
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1 Introduction
A MANET is formed by a group of wireless nodes, each of which performs routing functions and forwards
packets for others. No ﬁxed infrastructure (i.e., access point) is required, and wireless nodes are free to
move around. A ﬁxedinfrastructure can be expensive, time consuming, or impractical. Another advantage of
wireless ad hoc networks is the expansion of communication distance. In an infrastructure wireless network,
nodes are restricted to move within the transmission range of access points. Ad hoc networks relax this
restriction by cooperative routing protocols where every node forwards packets for the rest of the nodes
in the network. Potential applications of wireless ad hoc networks include military battle ﬁeld, emergency
rescue, campus networking, etc.
Wireless ad hoc networks face all the security threats of wireline network routing infrastructures, as well
as new threats due to the fact that mobile nodes have constrained resources (e.g., CPU, memory, network
bandwidth, etc), and lack physical protection. One critical threat faced by most routing protocols is that
a single misbehaving router may completely disrupt routing operations by spreading fraudulent routing
information since a trustworthy and cooperative environment is often assumed. Consequences include, but
are not limited to: 1) packets may not be able to reach their ultimate destinations; 2) packets may be routed
to their ultimate destinations over non-optimal routes; 3) packets may be routed over a route in the control
of an adversary.
Many mechanisms [20,19,1,7,18] have been proposed for securing routing protocols by providing se-
curity services, e.g., entity authentication and data integrity, or by detecting forwarding level misbehaviors
[12,10]. However, most do not validate the factual correctness of routing updates. One notable protocol is
superSEAD proposed by Hu, et al [8,9]. SuperSEAD is based on the Distance Sequenced Distance Vec-
tor (DSDV) routing protocol [14], and uses efﬁcient cryptographic mechanisms, including one-way hash
chains and authentication trees, for authenticating sequence numbers and distances of advertised routes. Su-
perSEAD can prevent a misbehaving node from advertising a route with 1) a sequence number larger than
1 Draft version: May 30, 2004.the one it received most recently (larger sequence number fraud); and 2) a distance shorter than the one
it received most recently (shorter distance fraud) or the same as the one it received most recently (same
distance fraud). However, superSEAD does not prevent a misbehaving node from advertising a route with
1) a sequence number smaller than any one it has received (smaller sequence number fraud); or 2) a dis-
tance longer than any one it has received (longer distance fraud). Another disadvantage is that SuperSEAD
assumes the cost of a network link is one hop, which may limit its applicability. For example, it may not
applicable to a DV which uses network bandwidth as a parameter for computing cost metrics.
1.1 Problems and Results
Smaller sequence number and longer distance frauds clearly violate the routing protocol speciﬁcations, and
can be used for non-benevolent purposes (e.g., selﬁshness). Although the damage they can cause has been
thought less serious than those of larger sequence number fraud or shorter distance fraud, we believe they
still need to be addressed for many reasons. Two of them are as follows: 1) they can be used by selﬁsh nodes
to avoid forwarding trafﬁc, thus detecting these frauds would signiﬁcantly reduce the means of being selﬁsh;
2) it is always desirable to detect any violation of protocolspeciﬁcations even though itsdamage may remain
unclear or the probability of such violation seems low. Past experience has shown that today’s naive security
vulnerabilities can often be exploited to launch serious attacks and to cause dramatic damages in the future.
For example, a vulnerability of TCP sequence number prediction was discussed as early as 1989 [3], but
was widely thought to be very difﬁcult to exploit given the extremely low probability (
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿ ) of guessing a
correct sequence number. It did not attract much attention until April 2004 when a technique was discovered
which takes less time to predict a correct TCP sequence number.
In this paper, we propose the use of consistency checks to detect sequence number frauds and distance
frauds in DSDV. Our protocol, namely S-DSDV, has the following security properties, provided that no two
nodesareincollusion:1)detectionofany distancefraud(longer, same,orshorter);2)detectionofbothlarger
and smaller sequence number fraud. One notable feature of S-DSDV is that a misbehaving node surrounded
by well-behaved nodes can be contained. Thus, misinformation can be stopped in the ﬁrst place before
it spreads into a network. Our efﬁciency analysis shows that S-DSDV produces higher network overhead
than superSEAD. However, S-DSDV overhead can be controlled by adjusting conﬁgurable parameters, e.g.,
interval of consistency checks. We believe that network overhead caused by S-DSDV can be justiﬁed by its
enhanced security.
Thesequelis organized asfollows. Section 2provides backgroundinformationofdistancevectorrouting
protocol and DSDV. Section 3 presentsoverview and security analysis of SEAD. A threat model is discussed
in Section 4. S-DSDV is presented and analyzed in Section 5. Efﬁciency of S-DSDV is compared with
superSEAD by analysis and simulation in Section 6. We conclude the paper in the last section.
2 Background
In this section, we provide background information for simple distance vector routing protocols and DSDV
[14]. Readers familiar with these topics can skip this section.
2.1 Notations
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￿ is a set of nodes and
￿ is a set of links. A distance
vector route may consist of some of the following ﬁelds:
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The advantages of DV routing protocols include: simplicity, low storage requirement, and ease of imple-
mentation. However, they are subject to short or long alive routing loops. Routing loops are primarily caused
by the fact that selection of next hops is made in a distributed fashion based on partial and possibly stale
information. Routing loops can also be manifested in the propagation of routing updates by the problem of
count-to-inﬁnity [11].
To mitigate the problem of count-to-inﬁnity, several mechanisms may be used: 1) setting the maximum
network diameter to k (limited network boundary). As a result, the problem of count-to-inﬁnity becomes
count-to-k; 2) not advertising a route back to the node this route is learned from (split-horizon); 3) advertis-
ing a inﬁnite route back to the node this route is learned from (split-horizon with poisoned reverse).
2.3 DSDV
DSDV[14] isarouting protocolbasedonaDV approach,speciﬁcallydesignedforwirelessadhocnetworks.
DSDV solves the problem of routing loops and count-to-inﬁnity by associating each route entry with a
sequence number indicating its freshness. The split-horizon mechanism cannot be applied to a wireless ad
hoc network due to its broadcast nature. In wireline network, a node can decide over which link (or to which
node) a routing update will be sent. However, in a wireless ad hoc network, a routing update is transmitted
by broadcast and is received by every wireless node within a transmission range. Thus, it is impossible to
selectively decide which nodes to receive a routing update.
In DSDV, a sequence number is linked to a destination node, and usually is originated by that node (the
owner). The only case that a non-owner node updates a sequence number of a route is when it detects a
link break on that route. An owner node always uses even-numbers as sequence numbers, and a non-owner
node always uses odd-numbers. With the addition of sequence numbers, routes for the same destination are
selected based on the following rules: 1) a route with a newer sequence number is preferred; 2) in the case
that two routes have a same sequence number, the one with a better cost metric is chosen.2.4 Security Threats to DSDV
DSDV guarantees all routes are loop free. However, it assumes that all nodes are trustworthy and coopera-
tive. Thus, a single misbehaving node may be able to completely disrupt the routing operation of a whole
network. We focus on two serious threats - the manipulation of sequence numbers and the manipulation
of cost metrics. Speciﬁcally, a misbehaving node can poison other nodes’ routing tables or affect routing
operations by advertising routes with fraudulent sequence numbers or cost metrics.
To protect a routing update message against malicious modiﬁcation, public key based digital signatures
may be helpful. For example,
’
( sends to
’
- a routing update signed with
’
( ’s private key.
’
- can verify the
authenticity of the routing update using
’
)
( ’s public key. However, digital signatures cannot prevent a mali-
cious entity (
’
( itself or any entity with the knowledge of
’
( ’s private key) from advertising false information
(e.g., false sequence number or distance). In other words, message authentication cannot guarantee the fac-
tual correctness of a routing update. For example, when
’
)
( advertises to
’
￿
- a route for
’
$
k with a distance of
2,
’
￿
- is supposed to re-advertise that route with a distance of 3 provided that it is the best known route to
’
)
( . However,
’
￿
- can advertise that route with any other distance value without being detected by a message
authentication mechanism.
3 SEAD Review
Hu, et al [8,9] made a ﬁrst attempt to authenticate the factual correctness of routing updates using one-
way hash chains. Their proposal, based on DSDV and called SEAD [8], can prevent a malicious node from
increasing a sequence number or decreasing a distance of an advertised route. In the above example,
’
￿
-
cannot successfully re-advertise the route with a distance shorter than 2. However, SEAD cannot prevent
’
￿
-
from advertising a distance of 2 or longer (e.g., 4). In SuperSEAD [9], they proposed to use combinations
of one-way hash chains and authentication trees to force a node to increase the distance of an advertised
route when it re-advertises that routing update. In the above example,
’
￿
- cannot advertise a distance of 2.
However,
’
￿
- is free to advertise a distance longer than 3.
We describe SEAD in the remainder of this section. Due to space limitation, we omit description of
SuperSEAD since it involves complex usage of authentication trees. We give a brief introduction of one-
way hash chains, then provide an overview of SEAD, including its assumptions, protocol details, security
properties, and some limitations.
3.1 One-Way Hash Chains
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3.2 Assumptions
As any other secure routing protocol, SEAD requires cryptographic secrets for entity and message authen-
tication. Public key infrastructure or pair-wise shared keys can meet such requirement. Other key estab-
lishment mechanisms can also be used. For simplicity, we assume that each node (
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h ). Each node’s public key is certiﬁed by an central authority trusted by everynode in the network. To minimize computational overhead, every node also establishes a different secret key
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scale to a large network without a limitation on its boundary. However, a distance vector routing protocol
is usually used for a small or medium size network. Thus, it is realistic to assume that the diameter of a
network is limited to
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3.3 Review of SEAD Protocol Details
SEAD authenticates the sequence number and the distance of a route with an authentication value which is
an element from a hash chain. Speciﬁcally, to advertise a route
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3.4 Security Analysis
SEAD has a number of desirable security properties (Table 1):
1. Message and identity authentication.
2. Sequence number authentication. Provided there are no two nodes in collusion, a bad node cannot cor-
rupt another node’s routing table by advertising a route with a sequence number greater than the latest
one originated by the destination of that route.
3. Cost metric authentication. Provided there are no two nodes in collusion, a bad node cannot corrupt
another node’s routing table by advertising a route with a distance shorter than the one it learns from
one of its neighbors.
4. Partially Resilient to collusion. Given a group of colluding nodes, the shortest distance they can claim to
a destination without being detected is the shortest distance from any node in the colluding group to that
destination. For example, if
&
"
￿
￿
’ are in collusion, and
&
"
￿
￿
’ are 3 and 5 hops awayfrom
l respectively. The
shortest distance to
l which
& and
’ can claim is 3-hop. Thus, we say that SEAD is partially resisting to
collusion given that colluding nodes cannot claim an arbitrary distance to a destination as they will.
Security Property SEAD superSEAD S-DSDV
Data Integrity
¶
¶
¶
Data Origin Authentication
¶
¶
¶
Destination Authentication
¶
¶
¶
Sequence Number Authentication larger
¶
¶
¶
smaller
•
•
¶
Cost Metric Authentication longer
•
•
¶
same
•
¶
¶
shorter
¶
¶
¶
Resisting to 2-node collusion
‚
‚
•
Table 1. Comparison of Security Properties:
• - not supported;
‚ - partially supported;
¶ - fully supported;
Despite its distinguishable security properties, SEAD has some limitations.
1. Vulnerable to longer distance fraud fraud. A misbehaving node can advertise a route with a distance
longer than the actual distance of that route without being detected. For example, a node
r located
￿
hops away from
} can successfully advertise a route for
} with a distance
￿
v
·
￿
￿ . This is possible
because
r which receives a hash
!
S
￿
A
￿
￿
￿ can compute it forward as many times as it likes and use a
computed hash value (i.e.,
!
k
￿
￿
￿ ) to support its claim of distance
￿ .
2. Vulnerable to lower sequence number fraud. A misbehaving node
r can advertise a sequence number
lower than the one it receives. Thus,
r may be able to advertise a route with a shorter distance by
lowering its sequence number.
3. A risk window. SEAD has a risk window of
#
A , where
#
A is the interval of periodic routing update. For
example, a node
r which had been
￿ hops away from
} can still claim that distance when it actually has
moved further away from
} since
r has the authentication value
!
S
￿
￿
￿ to support its claim. Such claim
would continue to be valid until a victim receives an advertised route for
} from other nodes with a
newer sequence number. Although such risk window is usually short (e.g., 15 seconds in SEAD), it is
still desirable to minimize it.4 A Threat Model
There are many threats against a routing protocol. In this section, we discuss these threats and identify those
of our interest. We ﬁrst clarify the difference between a routing protocol and a routing algorithm, which are
often not clearly addressed in literature.
4.1 Threat Targets
The primary objective of a network layer is to provide routing functionality to allow non-directly connected
nodes to communicate with each other. Thus, two fundamental functions are required for a router:
1. Establishing valid routes (usually stored in a routing table) to each destination in a network. Although
routing tables for a small and relatively static network can be manually created and maintained, it is
desirable to automate the task. Automatic mechanisms for building and updating routing tables are often
referred to as route propagation mechanisms or routing protocols.
2. Routing datagrams to a next hop(s) leading to their ultimate destinations. Such function is often referred
to as routing algorithms, which selects next hops for a datagram given a set of established routes and
other factors (e.g., routing policies). Example routing strategies include, but not limited to: 1) routing
datagrams to a default gateway; 2) routing datagrams over shortest paths; 3) routing datagrams equally
over multiple paths; 4) stochastic routing.
Although these two functions are equally important and both deserve attentions, this paper only con-
siders threats against automatic route propagation mechanisms, speciﬁcally, DSDV. A routing protocol is
usually built upon other protocols (e.g., IP, TCP, or UDP). Thus, it is vulnerable to all threats against its
underlying protocols (e.g., IP spooﬁng). In this paper, we do not consider the threats against the underneath
protocols. However, some of the inherited threats can be mitigated by proposed cryptographic mechanisms.
4.2 Threat Sources
In a wireline network, threats can be from a network node or a network link (i.e., an attacker is in control
of that link). Attacks from a controlled link include modiﬁcation, deletion, insertion, or replay of routing
update messages. In MANET, attacks from network links are less interesting due to the broadcast nature of
wirelessnetworks. It appears difﬁcult, if not impossible, for an attackto modify or deletea message (
￿ ), i.e.,
to stop the neighbors of the originator of
￿ from receiving untampered
￿ . However, insertion and replay are
still possible. For simplicity, we model a compromised network link as an adversary node. Thus, a network
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nodes, and
￿ is a set of edges.
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‰ . A misbehaving node can be a compromised legitimate node
(i.e., with legitimate cryptographic credentials), namely an insider, or an illegitimate node brought to the
network by an attacker (i.e., without any legitimate cryptographic credentials), namely an outsider.
4.3 Individual Threats
Barbir, Murphy and Yang [2] identiﬁed a number of generic threats to routing protocols, including Deliber-
ate Exposure, Snifﬁng, Trafﬁc Analysis, Interference, Overload, Spooﬁng, Falsiﬁcation, Byzantine Failures
(Table 2). We consider falsiﬁcation as one of the most serious threats to DSDV due to the fact that each node
builds its own routing table based on other nodes’ routing tables. This implies that a single misbehaving
node may be able to compromise the whole network by spreading falsiﬁed routing updates. Our proposed
S-DSDV can defeat this serious threat by containing a misbehaving node (i.e., by detecting and stopping
misinformation from further spreading).5 S-DSDV
Generic Threats Addressed
by S-DSDV?
Deliberate Exposure
•
Snifﬁng
•
Trafﬁc Analysis
•
Byzantine Failures
‚
Interference
‚
Overload
¶
Falsiﬁcation by Originators
¶
Falsiﬁcation by Forwarders
¶
Table 2. Routing Threats:
• - no;
‚ - partially;
¶ - fully;
In this section, we present the details of S-
DSDV, which can prevent any distance fraud,
includinglonger, same,or shorter, provided that
there are no two nodes in collusion.
5.1 Cryptographic Assumptions
As any other secure routing protocol, S-DSDV
requires cryptographic mechanisms for en-
tity and message authentication. Any secu-
rity mechanisms providing such security ser-
vices can meet our requirements, e.g., pair-wise
shared secret keys, public key infrastructure (PKI), etc. Thus, S-DSDV has similar cryptographic assump-
tions as SEAD (see
￿ 3.2) and S-AODV (requiring PKI). For convenience, we assume that every node
(
’
(
*
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￿ ) shares with every other node (
’
-
*
q
￿
￿
￿
￿
r
￿
:
￿
n
} ) a different pair-wised secret key (
￿
(
I
- ). Combined
with message authentication algorithms (e.g., MD5), pair-wise shared keys provide entity and message au-
thentication. Thus, all messages in S-DSDV are cryptographically protected. For example, when
r sends a
message
￿ to
} ,
r also sends to
} the Message Authentication Code (MAC) of
￿ generated using
￿
/
(
`
- .
5.2 Notations
We use
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
=
￿
￿
￿
˜
￿
1
ˆ
ﬁ
￿
0
￿
C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
&
"
￿
￿
ˆ
¤
￿
w
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
&
o
￿
￿
ˆ
¤
￿
w
￿
￿
 
"
!
$
#
￿
￿
1
&
"
￿
￿
ˆ
=
￿
￿
￿ to denote the route from
& to
ˆ , where
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
&
"
￿
￿
ˆ
=
￿
denotes the sequence number of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
¤
￿ ,
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
&
o
￿
￿
ˆ
¤
￿ denotes the cost of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
=
￿ , and
 
"
!
)
#
￿
￿
1
&
o
￿
￿
ˆ
¤
￿ denotes the next
hop of
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
¤
￿ . With no ambiguity, we also use
￿
1
ˆ
7
￿
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
w
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
ﬁ
￿
0
￿
C
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
w
￿
￿
 
"
!
$
#
p
￿ , or
￿
1
ˆ
ﬁ
￿
0
￿
C
￿
￿
￿
3
￿
B
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
¯
￿
￿
￿
￿
 
"
!
$
#
￿
￿
￿
￿ to
denote
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
=
￿ .
5.3 Route Classiﬁcation
We classify routes
˘
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￿
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￿
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￿
￿
￿
ƒ
V advertised by node
& into two categories: 1) those that
& is authoritative of,
denoted by
˘
=
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￿
.
￿
¨
￿ ; and 2) those that
& is unauthoritative of, denoted by
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Deﬁnition 1 (Authoritative Routes). Given a route
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It is obvious that
& is authoritative of
￿
￿ if
￿
￿ is a route for
& itself with a distance of zero. We also say
that
& is authoritative of
￿
￿
￿ if
￿
￿
￿ is an unreachable route. This is because
& has the authority to assert the
unavailability of a route from
& to any other node
ˆ even there factually exists such a path between
& and
ˆ .
This is equivalent to the case that
& implements a local route selection policy which ﬁlters out trafﬁc to and
from
ˆ . We believe that a routing protocol should provide such ﬂexibility for improving security since
&
may have its own reasons to distrust
ˆ . BGP [15] is a good example which allows for local routing policies.
However, this feature should not be considered the same as malicious packet dropping [12,10]. In the latter
case, a node promises to forward packets to another node (i.e., announcing reachable routes to that node)
but fails to do so.
Deﬁnition 2 (Non-Authoritative Routes). Given a route
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If
& advertises a reachable route
￿
￿
￿ for another node
ˆ , we say that
& is not authoritative of
￿
￿
￿ since
&
must learn
￿
￿
￿ from another node, i.e., the next hop from
& to
ˆ along the route
￿
￿
￿ .5.4 Route Validation
When a node
’ receives a route
￿
￿
￿ from
& ,
’ validates
￿
￿
￿ based on the following rules.
Rule 1 (Validating Authoritative Routes). If
& is authoritative of
￿
￿
￿ , a recipient node
’ validates the
message authentication code (MAC) of
￿
￿
￿ . If it succeeds,
’ accepts
￿
￿
￿ . Otherwise,
’ drops
￿
￿
￿ .
Since
& is authoritative of
￿
￿
￿ ,
’ only needs to validate the data integrity of
￿
￿
￿ , which includes data origin
authentication [13]. If it succeeds,
’ accepts
￿
￿
￿ since it in fact originates from
& and is not tampered. Oth-
erwise,
￿
￿
￿ may have originated from a node impersonating
& or it may have been modiﬁed by unauthorized
parties. Thus,
￿
￿
￿ should be ignored.
Rule 2 (Validating Non-Authoritative Routes). If
& is unauthoritative of
￿
￿
￿ , a recipient node
’ validates
the data integrity of
￿
￿
￿ . If it succeeds,
’ additionally validates the consistency (deﬁned by Deﬁnition 3) of
￿
￿ . If it succeeds,
’ accepts
￿
￿ . Otherwise,
’ drops
￿
￿ .
Since
& is unauthoritative of
￿
￿ , we require that
’ should not accept
￿
￿ right away even if the validation
of data integrity succeeds. Instead,
’ should check the consistency with the node which
￿
￿
￿ is learned from.
Ideally,
’ should consult with the authority of
￿
￿ if it exists. Such authority should have perfect knowledge
of network topology and connectivity (i.e., it knows the every route and its associated cost from every node
to every other node in a network). Such authority may exist for a small static network. However, it does not
exist in a dynamic wireless ad hoc network where nodes may move frequently.
Since there does not exist an authority that can tell the correctness of
￿
￿
￿ , we propose that
’ should
consult with the node which
￿
￿ is learned from. Such node should have partial authority of
￿
￿ . This method
is analogous to thewayhuman beings acquire their trust. Let
l bea student, and
m be
l ’s supervisor. Suppose
l receives an email from
˝ , saying that
m has called for a research meeting tomorrow.
l must trust the email
if
˝ is
m since
m is authoritative of arranging such a meeting. However, if
˝ is a student,
l may need to
conﬁrm the message with another person, ideally with
m , or possibly with another student.
Deﬁnition 3 (Consistency) Given a network
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From the deﬁnition, we know that
￿
￿ and
￿
b are consistent if
￿
￿ is directly computed from
￿
b following
DSDV speciﬁcations: 1) the sequence number should not be changed during route propagation; 2) the cost
metric of
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￿ should be the sum of the cost metrics of
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￿ . To complete a consistency check, a
node needs to talk to another node in 2-hop away by route requests and route responses. To obtain such
information, we require that the next hop of a route should be advertised along with that route. For example,
if
& learns a route
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
¤
￿ from
’ ,
& should advertise
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
¤
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
ˆ
7
￿
0
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
1
&
o
￿
￿
ˆ
¤
￿
w
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
3
￿
1
&
"
￿
￿
ˆ
=
￿
w
￿
￿
 
"
!
)
#
￿
￿
1
&
o
￿
￿
ˆ
¤
￿
￿
￿ , where
 
"
!
)
#
￿
￿
1
&
o
￿
￿
ˆ
¤
￿
E
￿
8
’ .
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The following process illustrates how S-DSDV works:
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￿ is protected by MAC.
2. Upon receiving from
& a route
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l
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￿ validates the MAC of the message carrying
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￿ . If it fails, the
message is dropped. Otherwise,
l further determines if
& is authoritative of
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￿ (Deﬁnition 1). If yes,
l
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￿ . Otherwise,
l checks the consistency of
￿
￿ with its next hop node (
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’ (see Step
3). If it succeeds,
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￿ is accepted. Otherwise, it is dropped.
3.
l sends a route request to
’ (likely via
& ), asking
￿
b
￿
1
ˆ
¤
￿ and
￿
b
￿
1
&
Y
￿ .
’ should send back a route response
containing its route entries for
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￿ ,
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￿ according to Deﬁnition 3. Note
& may manipulate
l ’s route request and/or
’ ’s
route response. However, such misbehavior will not go unnoticed since all message are MAC-protected.
5.6 Security Analysis
In this section, we analyze security properties of S-DSDV. We hope that our security analysis methodology
can lead to a common framework for analyzing and comparing different securing routing proposals.
Theorem 1 (Data Integrity) In S-DSDV, data integrity is protected.
Justiﬁcation. S-DSDV uses pair-wise shared keys with Message Authentication Code (MAC) to protect
integrity of routing updates. A routing update message with a invalid MAC can be detected.
Remarks. Data integrity can prevent unauthorized modiﬁcation and insertion of routing updates. How-
ever, it cannot prevent deletion or replay attacks. Thus it partially counters the threat of interference [2].
Theorem 2 (Data Origin Authentication) In S-DSDV, data origin is authenticated.
Justiﬁcation. S-DSDV uses pair-wise shared keys with Message Authentication Code (MAC) to protect
integrity of routing updates. Since every node shares a different key with every other node, a correct MAC
of a message also indicates that the message is originated from the only other party the recipient shares a
secret key is with. Thus, data origin is authenticated.
Remarks. Data origin authentication can prevent node impersonation since any node without holding
the key materials of
l cannot originate messages using
l as the source without being detected. It can also
thwart the threat of falsiﬁcation by originators [2].
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￿ in S-DSDV, the threat of falsiﬁcation by forwarders can be
instantiated as follows: 1) falsifying the destination
￿
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￿
￿ ; 2) falsifying the sequence number
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￿ ; 3) falsifying
the cost metric, or the distance,
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￿ ; 4) falsifying the next hop
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Lemma 1 (Destination Authentication) In S-DSDV, a route with a falsiﬁed destination can be detected.
Justiﬁcation. Since S-DSDV assumes a pair-wised shared secret keys, we know that
￿
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& shares a secret key with
’ . If a destination node (
l ) in
￿ is falsiﬁed or illegitimate, then
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￿ ,
&
does not share a secret with
l . Thus,
l is detected as an illegitimate node.
Lemma 2 (Sequence Number Authentication) In S-DSDV, an advertised route
￿ with a falsiﬁed sequence
number can be detected provided there is at most one bad node in the network.Justiﬁcation. Suppose
⁄ is the only bad node in the network.
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with
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
‰ if
￿
C
￿
￿
￿
￿
‰ is faked. Therefore, the statement is proved.
Lemma 3 (Cost Metric Authentication) In S-DSDV, an advertised route
￿ with a falsiﬁed cost metric (or
distance) can be detected if there is at most one bad node in the network.
Justiﬁcation. Since a good node can uncover misinformation from a bad node by cross checking its
consistency with a good node, a falsiﬁed cost metric always causes inconsistency, thus can be detected (see
justiﬁcation for Lemma 2).
Lemma 4 (Next Hop Auth) In S-DSDV, an advertised route
￿ with a falsiﬁed next hop can be detected if
there is at most one bad node in the network.
Justiﬁcation. Let
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Theorem 3 (Routing Update Authentication) In S-DSDV, a routing update with misinformation can be
detected provided there is at most one bad node in a network.
Justiﬁcation. A routing update
˘ consists of a number of routes with one for each destination. Based on
Lemma 1, 2, 3, and 4, we know
￿
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￿
W
*
￿
˘ , any misinformation in
￿ can be detected if there is at most one bad
node in the network. Therefore, we conclude that misinformation in a routing update, which is a collection
of
￿ , can be detected.
Theorem 4 (Multiple Bad Nodes) In S-DSDV, a routing update with misinformation can be detected with
a high probability provided that no two nodes are in collusion.
Justiﬁcation. Let
l be the router advertising a route
￿
￿
￿ . Let
m be the next hop router of
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the route provided by
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that both
l and
m are bad. We say
l and
m are in collusion if
m intentionally covers
l ’s misbehavior, i.e.,
m
intentionally provides a falsiﬁed
￿
￿ so that it is consistent with
￿
￿ . In this case, consistency check with only
one node will fail.
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inconsistent is high.6 Efﬁciency Analysis
We analyze routing overhead caused by S-DSDV (S-DSDV overhead) and compare it with those caused by
DSDV, SEAD, and superSEAD. We use the notations in Table 3 for efﬁciency analysis.
Notation Description Value
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Table 3. Notations for Efﬁciency Analysis (
￿ - obtained by simulation;
￿ - dependent on
￿ values)
6.1 Analysis Methodology
We adopt a method of using both analysis and simulation for comparing routing overhead. Analysis has the
advantage that it is easy for others to verify our results. Simulation has the advantage of dealing with the
implications of random events which are difﬁcult to obtain by analysis.
To analyze routing overhead, we need to obtain the total number of routing updates generated by all
nodes in a network during a time period of
￿ . In DSDV, there are two types of routing updates: 1) periodic
routing updates; and 2) triggered routing updates (e.g., by broken links). In theory, the total number of pe-
riodic routing updates (
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k ) can be calculated. However, the total number of triggered updates (
ł
.
… ) cannot
be easily calculated since they are related to random events, i.e., broken links caused by node movement. In
the absence of an analytic method for computing the number of broken links resulting from a node mobility
pattern, we use simulation to obtain
ł
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… . We also use simulation to obtain
ł
p
ø
￿
k since it is affected by
ł
.
… in
the DSDV implementation in NS-2 [4]. For simplicity, we use the following assumptions and notations:
1. DSDV,SEAD,andS-DSDVrunoverUDPandIP. 802.11MTU(MaximumTransferUnit)is 1500bytes.
A routing update message including IP and UDP headers larger than 1500 bytes is split into multiple
messages. There is no network congestion, packet dropping, or retransmission.2. Each triggered routing update consists of a single entry for a route involved in the triggering event. If
there are multiple routes affected by that event, multiple triggered routing updates are generated.
3. A DSDV route entry consists of a destination (4-byte), a sequence number (4-byte), and a cost metric
(2-byte). Thus,
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5. A superSEAD route entry consists of a DSDV route entry plus (k+1) ﬁelds of length
œ
¨
￿
˙
“
¨ holding
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￿
J
￿
￿
￿
j
￿
z
￿
1
 
o
￿
￿
￿
›
￿
j
￿
￿
￿
v
￿
￿
￿
C
￿
￿
￿ . In this paper,
￿
J
￿
n
￿
]
￿
p
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
. Thus,
œ
“
¯
“
¯
￿
˙
k
ß
.
￿
œ
￿
k
“
k
b
ß
.
X
[
￿
N
￿
7
X
[
Z
￿
￿
￿
￿
J
œ
¨
￿
˙
“
¨
￿
”
Z
6
X
q
￿
￿
X
8
Z
￿
￿
￿
￿
￿
Z
6
￿
[
￿
6
bytes.
6. An S-DSDV route entry consists of a DSDV route entry plus a 4-byte length ﬁeld holding the identity
of a next hop node. Thus,
œ
“
k
“
k
b
ß
.
￿
q
œ
t
k
“
k
b
ß
.
X
￿
￿
￿
Z
￿
bytes.
7. An S-DSDV consistency check involves a route request and a response message; each message has an S-
DSDV route entry (plus IP and UDP headers), and traverses two hops. Thus, routing overhead generated
per consistency check is
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We expected and observed that S-DSDVproduces high network overhead since it checks the consistency
of a route whenever it is updated for sequence number, distance, or the next hop. Since the sequence number
changes persistently, a large number of consistency checks are triggered. To reduce S-DSDV overhead, we
introduce a variation of S-DSDV, namely, S-DSDV-R. S-DSDV-R checks the consistency of a route when
it is ﬁrst installed in a routing table. A timer is set for that route when a consistency check is performed for
that route. In our simulation, the timer interval is same as the routing update interval. A new consistency
check is only performed for a route when its consistency check timer expires. One security vulnerability of
S-DSDV-R is that a falsiﬁed route may be accepted during the interval of two consistency checks. This is
similar to the risk window of SEAD and superSEAD (
￿ 3.4). We use the following equations to calculate
network overhead of each protocol:
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6.2 Simulation Results
We use simulation to obtain
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￿ , and
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￿ . We simulate a network with
 
U
￿
[
￿
6
mobile nodes for T
= 900 seconds. Different pause times represent different dynamics of a network topology. A pause time of
0 seconds represents a constantly changing network, while a pause time of 900 seconds represents a static
network. Simulation results for parameters as given in Table 3 and 4 are illustrated in Figure 2.
6.3 Discussions
S-DSDV produces higher network overhead than superSEAD due to the overhead of signiﬁcant number of
consistency checks, which we see as the price paid for improved security. S-DSDV-R signiﬁcantly reduces
the network overhead, but introduces a risk window similar to the one of SEAD and superSEAD. However,
such risk window can be managed by adjusting the value of the consistency check timer. Overall, we think
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Table 4. Averaged values obtained from 6 simulation runs for the total number of periodic and triggered routing updates, total
number of consistency checks of S-DSDV and S-DSDV-R.
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Fig.2. Overhead of DSDV, SEAD, S-DSDV-R, SuperSEAD, and S-DSDV. Note that S-DSDV has higher network overhead than
superSEAD due to signiﬁcant number of consistency checks but offers better security. S-DSDV-R signiﬁcantly reduces network
overhead, but introduces a risk window similar to those of SEAD and superSEAD.7 Concluding Remarks
We propose to use consistency checks for validating DSDV routing updates. Information required for con-
sistency checks can be obtained out-of-band (i.e., by route requests and responses), or in-band (i.e., included
within a routing update). Let u,v,w be three nodes. When
& advertises a route
￿
￿
￿ to
’ , it digitally signs
￿
￿
￿ .
When
’ computes a route
￿
b based on
￿
￿
￿ and sends
￿
b to
ˆ ,
’ digitally signs
￿
b . In addition,
’ also forwards
￿
￿
￿ along with
& ’s signature to
ˆ . In this way,
ˆ can perform consistency check of
￿
b and
￿
￿
￿ . Since in-band
mechanism involves generation and veriﬁcation of digital signatures, it increases computational overhead
and may subject to denial of service attacks. We plan to generalize the mechanisms for validating routing
updates, and apply to other routing protocols.
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